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A LEFT OF LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF 
TRUMP’S “BIG” WIN 
PART ONE: NEOLIBERALISM 
Duncan Kennedy* 
This will hopefully be the first of three short pieces about the election, deal-
ing here with the role of neoliberalism, then with “political correctness,” and 
lastly with resistance. 
 
The question of interpreting Donald Trump’s election, in liberal discourse, 
is mainly “how can he have won, given that he is racist and sexist?” The an-
swer of many of my friends is that he won because his racism and sexism ap-
pealed to a shockingly large part of the electorate, confirming that “our whole 
society is sexist and racist.” According to the liberal conception, this is particu-
larly true of the non-college part of the electorate, which had more “traditional” 
(racist and sexist) values and less cognitive ability to figure out that he was go-
ing to screw them. If they were not racist and sexist, they would have rejected 
him outright, no matter how much they didn’t like Hillary. I think class, race 
and sex were key to everything, but in a different way than in that account. 
It’s hard to argue with the more careful, liberal-Democratic account in 
which the answer to the question “why is he president?” is that the swing states 
just barely tipped to Trump in spite of Clinton’s solid victory in the popular 
vote. Why did that happen? The outcomes in Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wiscon-
sin, etc. were so close that many situational factors could have been enough to 
determine the outcome. 
Race figures in this analysis not as a general characteristic of the electorate 
but as one factor among many. The suppression of black votes in swing states 
is one of the things that could have made the difference. Another is Trump’s 
“dog whistle” to serious white supremacists, which probably helped turn out 
previous non-voter racists. But at the same time we can attribute it to Comey, 
or to taking the rust belt for granted, or to Russian hacking, or to “the treacher-
ous liberal media,” to Hillary’s personal weakness as a candidate, or any num-
ber of others, maybe even Bernie. Or all of them together. 
Then there is the “structural” factor: white, non-college voters are 
overrepresented in swing states compared to the country as a whole, giving 
their rational and irrational resentments an accidentally outsized importance in 
this particular race. Last, African-Americans voted overwhelmingly for Clin-
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ton, but in nothing like the numbers for Obama, and it is hard to see voter sup-
pression as explaining the whole effect. 
Which factor we choose to focus on is not about the “true” cause, but about 
what we think is important in terms of our larger agenda. My larger agenda is 
to understand the race/gender/class dynamics of the current situation in order to 
get a sense of what the future is likely to hold in terms of perils and possibili-
ties. In big terms, I want to argue the election did not signal a major shift to the 
right of American political consciousness, but it did signal a rebellion (not a re-
volt), by many non-college-educated whites in red states, swing states, and red 
pockets in blue states; against both political parties. 
According to The Upshot, “Mrs. Clinton won Mr. Obama’s white working 
class supporters by a margin of only 78 percent to 18 percent.”1 While racism 
and sexism were definitely major factors in the election and in American socie-
ty in general, they do not come close to explaining how Trump won Obama’s 
sure thing swing states, and 62 percent of white non-college women.2 
The large shift in voting by non-college-educated whites was, at least in 
part, plausibly a protest against the long running, shared neoliberal policy 
agenda of Democrats and Republicans that has “devastated” (just as Trump 
said) their communities. It was also plausibly a protest by non-college educated 
whites with “traditional values” against the particular way of enforcing liberal 
values that is loosely and pejoratively called political correctness. 
I don’t think these rebellions are any more “the” cause of the outcome than 
Comey’s last minute intervention, but I think they are more interesting and 
more important for understanding the possibilities of resistance than the more 
situational factors. 
I.   NO MAJOR SHIFT TO THE RIGHT 
The election did not see significant changes in the balance of voting power 
among different political tendencies. The overall pattern of voting was similar 
to what it has been for the last many elections, with the country divided be-
tween red, blue, and swing states. Elections in the U.S. are close. The swing 
states, including some that pollsters had thought blue, went for Trump but by 
such small margins that the swing was much smaller than Clinton’s popular 
vote margin.3 
That margin was possible in spite of an increased Republican vote in many 
red states because Hillary increased the Democratic vote in solid blue states, 
                                                
1  Nate Cohn, Turnout Wasn’t the Driver of Clinton’s Defeat, N.Y. TIMES (MAR. 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/upshot/a-2016-review-turnout-wasnt-the-driver-of-
clintons-defeat.html [https://perma.cc/GD6L-WHGU]. 
2  Clare Malone, Clinton Couldn’t Win Over White Women, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 9, 
2016, 7:16 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/clinton-couldnt-win-over-white-women 
[https://perma.cc/8BDQ-CHQS]. 
3  Tim Meko et al., How Trump Won the Presidency with Razor-Thin Margins in Swing 
States, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/20 
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especially California and New York.4 At the micro level, within all states, 
“purple” counties (split between red and blue) continued to disappear at a sur-
prising rate. Today, 61 percent of voters vote in counties that went for one can-
didate or the other by 60 percent or more, compared to 39% in 1992.5 Moreo-
ver, “between 1992 and 2016, the share of voters living in extreme landslide 
counties quintupled from 4 percent to 21 percent.”6 In other words, the main 
shift was the intensification both at the state level and at the county level of the 
geographical polarization of the electorate. 
The Republicans now control all federal branches and completely or par-
tially control many state governments in red states. But there are many more 
red than blue states, and the Democrats completely or partially control state 
government in the populous, rich, culturally-dominant East and West coastal 
states. American federalism involves what, to Europeans, looks like massive 
delegations of power to the states, limiting the practical ability of the central 
(Trumpist) government to impose policy downward. Nonetheless the shift in 
state power at the national level, as opposed to electoral support, may give the 
Republicans/Trumpists a chance to change the electoral balance for the future. 
And the shift in state power has already permitted them to inflict major some-
times irreparable harm on the vulnerable across the social spectrum. 
II.   REBELLION OF NON-COLLEGE-EDUCATED WHITES AGAINST 
“DEVASTATION” 
To my mind, the shift in voting by non-college whites is the most interest-
ing development of this cycle because of what it says about race and gender 
politics in the U.S. now and in the future. 
The first interesting piece of evidence was the 538 column on districts in 
swing states that flipped from Obama to Trump or from Romney to Clinton.7 
The study claimed that the thing that explained the flips was educational level, 
not income, with non-college districts going toward Trump and college-
educated ones going toward Hillary8. The number of such districts was not 
large; most districts everywhere voted Republican or Democratic as they had in 
previous elections. Flipping is rare. 
                                                
4  Compare 2016 Presidential Election Results, POLITICO (Dec. 13, 2016, 1:57 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/2016-election/results/map/president [https://perma.cc/F7Y7-YQG 
P] with Presidential Election Results, NBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2017, 2:02 PM), http://elec 
tions.nbcnews.com/ns/politics/2012/all/president/#.WOKOOhjMy8o [https://perma.cc/Z26 
Y-Q7FS]. 
5  David Wasserman, Purple America Has All But Disappeared, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 8, 
2017, 11:33 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/purple-america-has-all-but-disappear 
ed [https://perma.cc/NY8R-4GK9]. 
6  Id. 
7  Clare Malone, Clinton Couldn’t Win Over White Women, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 9, 
2016, 7:16 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/clinton-couldnt-win-over-white-women 
[https://perma.cc/HA48-TZAP]. 
8  Id. 
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A further study suggested that there were indeed many voters who flipped.9 
But to explain the change in the outcome in swing states, two more significant 
factors were: first, that many non-college white voters who had voted for 
Obama did not turn out for Clinton or voted for third party candidates and, se-
cond, that many non-college whites who had not voted in 2012 turned out to 
vote for Trump.10 Non-college voter participation stayed close to constant, but 
the balance of enthusiasm and apathy shifted—red intensity overwhelming blue 
abstention. 
Why would non-college whites vote for Trump instead of for Hillary? One 
part of the answer might be that they were voting against Hillary for the same 
reason they voted against Bush and Kasich in the primary. In other words, not 
because Trump was a Republican, but because he was trashing the dominant 
policies of the Democratic-Republican, neoliberal consensus. From this point 
of view, a crucial moment was his question to Hillary: you’ve been here for 25 
years and what have you accomplished? 
My liberal, and especially feminist, friends thought this was a truly bizarre 
charge: Hillary is one of the most accomplished human beings on the planet, as 
they understand it. But I think the meaning was that, in spite of progressive 
rhetoric supposedly favoring the weak and marginalized, liberal Democrats led 
by Hillary, Bill, and Obama, whether in power or out, have not managed to 
stem large losses—social, economic, cultural—to the people whose votes 
Trump was after. 
This is about the “devastation” claim Trump made in the inaugural ad-
dress.11 The claim is obviously false if understood as “Hillary has accomplished 
nothing at all” or “America is devastated.” The point is nothing has been ac-
complished for a specific subset of non-college-educated whites. It makes no 
difference that unemployment is down to four percent nationally. The claim is 
about something that has been happening in particular, distinct locales. That 
things are going better or even very well in other locales just makes it worse. 
Red states and red areas in blue states have larger poor, white, non-college 
populations than blue states and blue areas in red states.12 They are concentrat-
ed in areas that are post-industrial (read rust belt), or areas with declining agri-
                                                
9  Philip Bump, The Counties That Flipped Parties to Swing the 2016 Election, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/15/the-count 
ies-that-flipped-parties-to-swing-the-2016-election/?utm_term=.956a9c17e95c [https://perm 
a.cc/F2UR-MZUN]. 
10  Konstantin Killibarda & Dana Roithmeyer, The Myth of the Rust Belt Revolt, SLATE (Dec. 
1, 2016, 3:59 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/12/ 
the_myth_of_the_rust_belt_revolt.html [https://perma.cc/J8MZ-F3UM]. 
11  Daniel Dale, Trump Casts Himself as America’s Savior in Fiery Inaugural Address, 
THESTAR.COM (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2017/01/20/donald-
trump-inauguration.html [https://perma.cc/R264-RSRA]. 
12  Neil Irwin & Josh Katz, The Geography of Trumpism, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Mar. 12, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/13/upshot/the-geography-of-trumpism.html [http 
s://perma.cc/35S2-YM8B]. 
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cultural employment.13 Those areas are losing population to the (relatively) 
new, rapidly developing, economically diversified, megacities on the coasts and 
in the sunbelt, in both red and blue states.14 
In declining areas, there are fewer and fewer high-paying, blue-collar jobs 
(manufacturing, construction, transport, agriculture, etc.), and low-skilled farm 
labor is long gone.15 Wages for this group have been stagnant or have actually 
gone down over the last thirty years. Jobs for people (mainly women) who have 
some college are also scarce because the main expanding areas of well-paid, 
white-collar jobs (e.g. health, education, finance, insurance, real estate, gov-
ernment) are in the megacities.16 
A declining population with a declining economic base sets up a classic 
pattern of center-periphery unstable equilibrium. Think of southern Italy in re-
lation to northern Italy. The center lures away the money of prosperous people 
and the most ambitious and competent of the young, inducing a downward spi-
ral in the periphery and fueling the ascent of the center. This dynamic, taking 
place in the world of “traditional values” about gender and sexuality, generates 
an accompanying process of “social decay.” 
No jobs for high school graduates means unstable unions, especially when 
women are staying in school longer and have better job prospects. Norms of 
early and life-long marriage, and of shotgun marriage instead of abortion, are 
changing surprisingly rapidly. Divorce is now much more prevalent in this 
group than among the blue-state college educated.17 More and more couples 
never marry. Single parenthood is becoming the norm rather than the excep-
tion. 
No jobs for high school graduates sharply reduces the incentive to finish, 
or to study where it isn’t required in order to stay in school. Dropping out or 
just very bad performance by the weakest students (mainly guys) further reduc-
es the employability of the young since good jobs require more, not less, educa-
tion. The opioid crisis is not some bizarre anomaly in a musical-comedy, happy 
Midwest, but a key aspect of an emerging culture of dysfunction. 
                                                
13  Agricultural Workers: Employment Outlook Handbook, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
https://www.bls.gov/ooh/farming-fishing-and-forestry/agricultural-workers.htm [https://perm 
a.cc/UPM6-STPC] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017). 
14  Population and Migration Overview, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-population/population-migration 
[https://perma.cc/B29P-TUVZ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017). 
15  Justin Fox, Farewell to the Blue-Collar Elite, FORBES (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.bloom 
berg.com/view/articles/2015-04-06/factory-worker-wages-are-nothing-special-these-days 
[https://perma.cc/5SXJ-HXSN]. 
16  Joel Koltkin, The U.S. Cities Creating the Most White-Collar Jobs, FORBES (July 21, 
2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2016/07/21/the-u-s-cities-creating-the-most-
white-collar-jobs-2016/#1bf0557f22be [https://perma.cc/LQ9V-SDJD]. 
17  Divorce Rate in the U.S., NAT’L CTR. FOR FAMILY AND MARRIAGE RES., BOWLING GREEN 
STATE UNIV., https://www.bgsu.edu/ncfmr/resources/data/family-profiles/anderson-divorce-
rate-us-geo-2015-fp-16-21.html [https://perma.cc/8LHN-G73Z] (last visited Apr. 3, 2017). 
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The crucial books here are Robert Putnam, Our Kids,18 from the left, and 
Coming Apart,19 by Charles Murray (yes, him), from the right, surprisingly in 
agreement that there is a white, ex-working class increasingly isolated from 
what is happening to everyone else and trapped (that is the word) at the bottom. 
But even where it is just decline, rather than “devastation,” they agree that the 
biggest change from the 1950s for non-college whites is the virtual disappear-
ance of upward social mobility. A high school diploma was once an indicator 
of promise; now, without more it indicates “no prospects.” 
In short, for this group, even Trump’s much mocked evocation of a golden 
American past is right on point. I think what has happened to this group is real-
ly bad. The victims certainly deserve part of the blame for their fate. A “tradi-
tional values” response to the crisis—say by banning sex education and abor-
tion—seems wildly counterproductive; locating the problem in big government 
or affirmative action or immigration likewise. 
But I don’t think the white, ex-working class deserves what has happened 
to them, even if racist and sexist attitudes and utterances and practices are more 
common (o.k., much more) there than among their college-educated counter-
parts. I think it was logical—if not justifiable—for non-college, white voters in 
these particular deindustrialized or declining agricultural locales to vote for 
Trump. 
He was equally contemptuous of Republicans and Democrats. Just maybe 
he intended to change whatever it was in the policies of both parties for the last 
few decades that had at least allowed, and maybe had actually produced, the 
“devastation” that they felt was obvious and undeniable. 
III.   NEOLIBERAL POLICIES CAUSED THE DEVASTATION 
Of course, phenomena like devastation are always causally over-
determined, just like the election outcome. And there is always the question of 
when we should regard an actor’s mere “failure to act” as a cause of bad things 
happening when it is not certain whether action would have made a difference. 
We choose to focus on particular active or passive behavior as a cause for rea-
sons of moral judgment and according to our own action agendas. 
I think the single most important cause of devastation has been the adop-
tion of “neoliberal” policies, equally by Democrats and Republicans, in and out 
of office, since approximately the Carter Administration. Nixon was the last 
president with a strong, affirmative model of state intervention to stabilize the 
system and inflect its growth. I certainly prefer the nicer Democratic neoliberal 
policies, but for the question of devastation I think they are equally to blame. 
I don’t think neoliberalism is a philosophy. I think of it as a set of policies 
that collectively eliminated particular regulatory structures that had produced 
relatively evenly distributed growth, leaving many other regulatory structures 
                                                
18  ROBERT PUTNAM, OUR KIDS (2016). 
19  CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART (2012). 
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in place. Rather than a coherent vision of “the market,” the drivers of policy 
change acted from a correct estimate that there would be many gainers, above 
all, and enormously the one percent for whom they acted. They had zero regard 
(or less!) for the many losers.  
While it is common to begin the policy list with the global dimension, our 
devastation begins at home. Democrats and Republicans agree on a decentral-
ized governmental structure that encourages states and municipalities to com-
pete for private investment, and permits investors to move within and between 
states, without any responsibility for consequences left behind. This is the sin-
gle most important legal/policy reason for decline of the peripheral area. 
Democrats and Republicans agree on a labor law regime that has shrunk 
and disempowered organized labor, so that new developing areas can offer low 
wages and worker passivity in comparison with declining areas, and workers 
left behind have no legal power to slow or reverse the process.20 
The deregulation of the financial system led to the concentration of eco-
nomic power at the national level.21 The surviving giants—whether banks, 
manufacturing companies, agribusinesses, or Walmart and the national chain 
stores—used their power to eliminate smaller, less-mobile companies whose 
prosperity was tied to local conditions.22 This freed them to make their own lo-
cation choices according to their national profit calculus regardless of local 
consequences.23 No more small-town downtown. 
This set of policies might have set up the downward-spiraling center-
periphery dynamic even without globalization. The domestic economy is large 
and diverse enough for neoliberal policies to produce “global” dynamics right 
here at home. Already in the 1930’s, industry was beginning to flee the high-
wage, strong-union, blue cities of the Northeast for Georgia and North Caroli-
na.24 
During that same period, cheap cotton production in Egypt and India 
threatened the global competitiveness of the American textile industry, which 
depended on Southern cotton produced by cheap ex-slave labor. When the rul-
ing planters and agribusinesses mechanized, they had enough power to throw 
about seven million black people off the land with no alternative to migration 
                                                
20  Julian Zelizer, How Labor Unions and Democrats Fell Out of Love, CNN (Aug. 31, 2014, 
12:25 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/31/opinion/zelizer-labor-democrats [https://perm 
a.cc/Z8BK-DR94]. 
21  Michel Chossudovsky, Global Financial Meltdown: Sweeping Deregulation of the U.S. 
Banking System, GLOB. RES. (Oct. 17, 2008), http://www.globalresearch.ca/global-financial-
meltdown-sweeping-deregulation-of-the-us-banking-system/10588 [https://perma.cc/9MX5-
G2CY]. 
22  Stacy Mitchell, The Impact of Chain Stores on Community, INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-
RELIANCE (Apr. 18, 2000), https://ilsr.org/impact-chain-stores-community [https://perma.cc/ 
26VL-G65E]. 
23  Contrast an earlier pro-small-business, antitrust philosophy and successful resistance in 
Japan. 
24  DANIEL R. FUSFIELD & TIMOTHY BATES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE URBAN GHETTO 
(1984). 
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northward. But . . . the industries that provided them unskilled jobs on arrival 
were just beginning to relocate from inner cities to the suburbs. The govern-
ment subsidized this move in many ways, from mortgage credit to transport, 
and guaranteed its segregation. The poorer they got, the less the abandoned in-
ner cities could compete for jobs with low tax white suburbs. 
By the seventies, when the migration slowed, the new ghettos had their 
own spiral of economic deprivation combined with socio-cultural shock, with 
the same indicators as in today’s non-college, white, marginalized areas. As 
with those areas today, the departure of African Americans with a chance in the 
post-civil rights, college-educated sector left the ghettos with “concentrated 
poverty.”25 
The racial spiral occurred before neo-liberal policy thinking had become 
hegemonic. The progressive wing of the Democratic Party with some liberal 
Republican allies argued for policies that would have, albeit just mildly, coun-
tered the center-periphery dynamic. Richard Nixon’s racist “southern strategy” 
successfully mobilized white fears against them. Left liberalism was over with 
Ted Kennedy’s loss to Carter in the 1980 primary and Reagan’s triumph. 
At the same time, global neoliberal policies have certainly been a major 
factor in the devastation story. I think these are the ones that have counted the 
most: 
The American red and blue elites collaboratively designed and implement-
ed a liberalized world economy, reducing tariffs (and non-tariff barriers) and 
creating a world capital market. Countries with low labor costs compete for di-
rect and indirect foreign investment by multinationals and banks. This is the 
basis of “outsourcing” from the US, eliminating jobs in declining areas. The 
global regime is a close parallel to the American federal system in which rising 
American states and municipalities offer American companies incentives for 
relocation from declining areas. 
The liberalization of trade with China produced a massive shift of manu-
facturing out of the US into Chinese factories, which sell us all kinds of con-
sumer goods at prices dramatically lower than before the shift. 
Permission, by non-action, of the immigration of millions of low-skilled, 
relatively uneducated workers from Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central Amer-
ica, combined with technological change and massive government subsidies to 
agribusiness, weakened the small farm town economy but increased productivi-
ty and dramatically lowered food prices. (Unskilled immigrant labor also obvi-
ously competes with unskilled black labor left behind in poor urban neighbor-
hoods, with liberals in denial.) Liberals sometimes speak as though support for 
immigration has been driven by human rights abuses, downplaying the dispos-
session of millions and millions of peasants by Latin American elites pursuing 
their own domestic neo-liberal policies. 
                                                
25  See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987); WILLIAM 
JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS (1996). 
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In this account, neoliberal political and legal projects, both domestic and 
international, have reconfigured the U.S. economy into its present pattern of 
red/blue/purple states and localities, and distributed non-college whites across 
that landscape. 
The reconfiguration, along with technological change, was the vehicle of a 
dramatic, long-term rise both in GDP per capita and in household wealth. The 
losses to the internal periphery have been no more than a small fraction, in dol-
lar terms, of the gains in dollars to the people living in the centers of develop-
ment. Those people include migrants from the internal American periphery 
who escaped to a better life in the cities, and a large, post-civil-rights, black, 
middle class. Moreover, the gains to perhaps a billion very poor people living 
in the countries that now export to the US have been life-transforming. 
IV.   BLUE AND RED ELITES SHARE POLITICAL/MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
DEVASTATION 
So what’s the problem? The neoliberal policies caused the good develop-
ment and they caused its bad effects. Because they are socio-cultural as well as 
economic, the bad effects go far beyond national trends of increased income 
and wealth inequality, wage stagnation, and differential red/blue state growth 
rates. They were concentrated on a subsector of non-college whites and the 
black, urban poor. The devastation has been a long-running story, first predict-
ed, then documented, then predicted some more, then documented some more. 
The bad effects were not a necessary cost of the gains. In other words, we 
could have had the gains of the transformation without the losses. The gains 
were so large that it would have been possible, without changing any neoliberal 
policy, to tax enough of them away from the gainers to fund large-scale at-
tempts to halt or reverse peripheral downward spirals. Alternatively, it would 
have been possible to alter many neoliberal policies at the micro level, selec-
tively departing from free trade and domestic uncompensated factor mobility 
(capital can’t just up and leave), to tilt toward losers. Or some combination. 
Nothing like that happened. This is obviously another over-determined dog 
that didn’t bark. Maybe it wouldn’t have worked anyway. Maybe American 
racism means there is no possible populist coalition of black and white outsid-
ers, and maybe that is, in spite of what I’ve just argued, the true lesson of the 
election. It does seem that at some point on the road to Citizens United (no lim-
its on campaign contributions to candidates and causes)26, those who gained the 
most from the neoliberal transformation, namely the one percent, acquired a 
lock on both political parties. 
According to Paul Krugman, because no one had proved that Hillary did a 
favor in exchange, it was outrageous to object to her millions of dollars in Wall 
Street speaking fees. To left outliers, it seems obvious why she didn’t release 
the transcripts: she was pledging her faith in “the market” as neoliberal policy 
                                                
26  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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for everyone, rich and poor alike, and against “redistribution” synonymous with 
“class warfare.” If your issue was devastation, it was reasonable to see this as a 
more significant non-disclosure than Trump’s sleazy tax return concealment. 
Suppose that it’s right that some interesting part of Trump’s switching non-
college, white votes, and of Hillary’s lost, no-show, white, non-college votes, 
were in rebellion against the Republican/Democrat, red/blue state consensus, 
from Bushes to Clintons. It seems clear already that nothing will come of it. 
The Inaugural was a farewell. These voters are obviously powerless in relation 
to the consensus. Only 40 percent of the electorate is white and non-college ed-
ucated;27 the putative rebels are a minority of the minority with no consensus 
about what’s wrong or what to do about it. In terms of resources, the whole 
point is that the elites have reaped all the money and embedded institutional 
power from the transformation. 
I don’t think either party has a pragmatic reason to “learn from the rust belt 
revolt.” Its success, if it was responsible for Trump, was an accident of the de-
mographics of the electoral college. But Trump may have created a new oppor-
tunity. The big, rich, progressive blue states could tax back rich people’s reduc-
tions at the federal level and innovate at home. Before looking at the 
implications of federalism for Trumpism, I turn now to the question of the “po-
litical correctness” issue in the election and its implications. 
                                                
27  David Wasserman, Mapping the 2016 Electorate: Demographics Don’t Guarantee a 
Democratic White House, COOK POL. REP. (June 19, 2015), http://cookpolitical.com/story/86 
08 [https://perma.cc/AX2D-LQUL]. 
